

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide guidance and establish procedures for prompt recognition, reporting, and disposition of incidents of attempted subversion and espionage directed against DIA personnel and the deliberate unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

2. **APPLICABILITY:** This regulation applies to all elements of the DIA.

3. **SUPERSESSION:** This regulation supersedes DIAR 54-3, 3 March 1977.

4. **GENERAL:** The DIA, with installations and personnel located worldwide, is a prime target for foreign intelligence, sympathizers of foreign governments or ideologies, and subversion both in continental United States (CONUS) and overseas. Defensive security measures are designed to preclude the subversion of personnel, the sabotage of installations, and the compromise of classified Defense information. However, personnel at all echelons must be cognizant of methods and goals of foreign intelligence and subversive elements and understand the methodology applied to subvert or entrap personnel. All DIA personnel are considered a potential source of information and, therefore, must be ever aware of this situation. The most common approach follows the pattern of developing an acquaintance and assessing the target individual for possible weaknesses which can be exploited. Exploitation of an individual may take the form of any of the following: Through the payment of money; the use of trickery; as a result of carelessness, ignorance or gullibility; through the use of coercion; or as a result of disaffection.

5. **RESPONSIBILITY:** DIA personnel, with knowledge of any of the following, are required to immediately notify their supervisor who will report the information to the Policy, Plans and Production Branch (RSS-1A) of the Counterintelligence Division (RSS-1).

a. Any attempt to induce an individual to reveal information contrary to the security and best interests of the United States.

b. Any offer to provide services or information of intelligence value to persons or groups believed to be in contact with foreign intelligence operations or whose activities and interests are considered to be inimical to the best interests of the U.S. Government.

c. Any attempt to cultivate, socially or otherwise, DIA personnel by representatives of foreign governments or groups whose interests are currently considered to be inimical to the U.S. Government.

d. Any receipt of favors or gifts from any representative of a foreign government which might be construed as placing the recipient under obligation for the purpose of providing information or other assistance.

e. Any act which might cause the individual to be subject to possible exploitation.

f. Any actions by individuals to pass classified Defense information to others who are unauthorized to receive that information.

g. Any telephonic contacts that attempt to solicit official information from DIA personnel. Telephonic requests may be made through use of a pretext that it is an official request, from a member of a legitimate organization, or from a representative of the news media.

6. **PROCEDURES:** Supervisors with knowledge or upon notification, will report these matters to RSS-1A directly and without delay. Appropriate security measures will be used to protect both the individual(s) concerned and the information. RSS-1A, as the office having primary interest in these counterintelligence matters, will be responsible for internal

DIAR 54-3

coordination and, as circumstances require, coordinate appropriate investigative action.

a. Personnel concerned, in the absence of any overriding circumstances, will not disturb the existing relationship between the parties involved without direction from RSS-1A.

b. Discussions of the incident or report will be held to the absolute minimum.


c. The conscious or deliberate failure of any DIA

member, either civilian or military, to report situations described in paragraph 5 may be grounds for appropriate disciplinary action under the provisions of DIAR 22-6 and 22-7 and appropriate Military Department regulations.

7. ORIENTATION: Supervisors at all echelons will insure that the provisions of this regulation are understood by all personnel under their supervision. Of utmost importance is the requirement for the early reporting of all related incidents or suspected incidents by members of the DIA.

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